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THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN ENGLISH AND
DUTCH LAW: A MULTIFUNCTIONAL AND
CONTEXT-DEPENDANT DIVIDE
GERDY JURGENS* AND FRANK VAN OMMEREN**
ABSTRACT. The main thesis of this article is that the public-private divide
has to be considered as a multifunctional and context-dependant divide.
This thesis is demonstrated by comparing English law and Dutch law. The
authors describe two areas in which the divide is relevant: judicial review
and the applicability of public law standards including human rights. In
both legal systems discussions concerning the private-public divide relate
to the transfer of power to private bodies. However, in the Dutch –
continental – legal system the label ‘public law’ is used in fewer kinds of
cases than in the English legal system. This remarkable finding might be
explained by the characterization of the public-private division as
multifunctional and context-dependant.
KEYWORDS: Judicial review; public law-private law boundary;
Netherlands; England
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the division between public and private law has not been
rooted in the legal system of England and Wales. However, in recent
decades English law has adopted a public-private divide that is, at least
at face value, similar to its Civil law counterparts. Indeed, the import-
ance of this distinction is gaining momentum in several areas of the law.
Unsurprisingly, however, this public-private distinction is highly con-
tested in some quarters. Several English law scholars have advocated
resistance to the public-private distinction because they consider it
unsuitable for English law;1 at least it would demand a fundamental
restructuring of English law to accommodate a public-private law
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distinction.2 Others have toned down the relevance of the distinction.3
But there is also support for the public-private law divide.4 It is inter-
esting to observe that in continental law discussions are also known
to flare up regarding the limits of this fundamental division despite
the public-private distinction having a much longer history and fun-
damental place in the legal system. The borders between public
and private law are not always set and neither are they very clear or
unchangeable.
A. Thesis and the objective of this article
In this article we will argue that the public-private divide has to be
considered as a multifunctional and context-dependant divide. The
public-private divide is multifunctional in the sense that it is used for
several judicial purposes. Moreover, the divide is context-dependant
because the choice to classify something as public or private depends
on its context in the legal system. With this thesis we will stress that the
main value of the public-private distinction is that it facilitates the jus-
tification and rationalization of certain choices in the legal system. For
example, the applicability of certain legal procedures, but also the
adoption of certain substantive principles or the implementation of
certain accountability mechanisms can be justified by the qualification
of a dispute as a public law or a private law matter.
Thus we distance ourselves from an approach in which the public-
private divide is considered to be a dichotomy; a divide in which
the labels “public” and “private” are exclusive or strictly separated.
Moreover, we distance ourselves from the conception that the public-
private law divide is universal or in a sense “given from above”. In such
an approach or conception – which, it should be stated from the outset,
is rejected by us – the observation that the public-private law divide is
not unambiguous may easily lead to the conclusion that the divide is
not workable and that the relevance of the distinction is limited.
B. Three lines of argumentation
Briefly, this article follows three lines of argumentation. Our main
thesis, further elaborated in part II, is that the public-private divide has
2 J.W.F. Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: a Historical and Comparative
Perspective in English Public Law, revised edn. (Oxford 2000).
3 D. Oliver, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (London 1999) and recently: “What, if
Any, Public-Private Divides Exist in English Law?” in M. Ruffert (ed.), The Public-Private Divide:
Potential for Transformation? (London 2009), 1 ff.
4 P. Cane, “Accountability and the Public/Private Distinction”, in N. Bamforth, P. Leyland (eds.),
Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Oxford 2003), 247 ff.; M. Freedland, “The Evolving
Approach to the Public/Private Distinction in English Law” in M. Freedland and J.-B. Auby
(eds.), The Public Law/Private Law Divide, Une entente assez cordiale? (Oxford & Portland Oregon
2006), 93 ff.
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to be considered as a multifunctional and context-dependant divide.
With this thesis we enter into a discussion with John Allison, who
presents the public-private divide as the supreme distinction in conti-
nental legal systems, moreover leading to a watershed between public
and private law. We will demonstrate our thesis by comparing English
law and Dutch law. Thus we attain our second line of argumentation:
setting the Dutch legal system alongside the five features of John
Allison’s model for a satisfactory and workable public-private distinc-
tion as drawn up in his well-known study A Continental Distinction in
the Common Law.5 Dutch law is interesting as a comparator for UK
law because it contains an extensive body of administrative law and has
a highly stratified division of public law and private law, which really
characterises the Dutch legal system as a continental system; but at the
same time it does not meet, in all respects, the features of John Allison’s
model. However, the public-private divide is deeply rooted in Dutch
law and is considered to be very workable by legal professionals. We
think that this can be explained by understanding the public-private
divide as a multifunctional and context-dependant division.
Our third line of argumentation is on a more concrete level, shifting
to a comparison of positive law. Apart from the fact that it is interest-
ing to see the similarities and the differences between the two legal
systems as to the qualifications “public” or “private”, the comparison
also serves our thesis about the multifunctional and context-dependant
character of the public-private divide. In order to demonstrate this
character, it is necessary to describe at least two areas in which the
divide is relevant. We have chosen an area of procedural law and an
area of substantive law. In part III we will pay attention to judicial
protection. In part IV the applicability of public and private law stan-
dards will be discussed. The distinction might of course also be relevant
for other purposes, particularly for political and democratic account-
ability. The various purposes we have chosen demonstrate, at the very
outset, the multifunctional character of the public-private distinction.
However, full consideration of all purposes for which the public-
private divide is used falls outside the scope of this article.
In parts III and IV we will start with a rather comprehensive de-
scription of the Dutch legal system in order to make the working of the
public-private law divide understandable for readers who are not
familiar with Dutch law. After that, it is possible to make a comparison
with English law. Beforehand, it is interesting to note that discussions
as to where the distinction between public law and private law should
be drawn in English law as well as in Dutch law relate to the transfer of
power to private bodies. However, the choices as to where to draw the
5 Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law.
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line between public and private law differ in both legal systems: for
instance, one remarkable point is that English law uses the label
“public law” in classes of cases which would be considered inconceiv-
able under Dutch law. These differences might be explained by the
characterization of the public-private divide as one which is multi-
functional and context-dependant.
II. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE AS A MULTIFUNCTIONAL
AND CONTEXT-DEPENDANT DISTINCTION
A. Allison’s Model Applied to Dutch Law
In his erudite historical and comparative study, John Allison offers a
very interesting model to explore the public-private divide. According
to Allison, a society with a satisfactory public-private distinction
should have the following characteristics:
– a prevailing and well-developed theory of the state, which appreci-
ates the distinctness of the state administration and ascribes to it
certain qualities which can be used to justify special legal conse-
quences;
– a categorical approach to law, meaning that the law is approached
with a sense of system and of the whole of law, particularly referring
to an ordering of law in divisions and subdivisions according to
clear criteria;
– a separation of powers between the judiciary and the adminis-
tration which ensures that the courts entrusted with administrative
disputes have both independence and expertise;
– an inquisitorial or investigative judicial procedure to resolve dis-
putes involving the administration.6
Allison argues that the absence of any of these features would seriously
reduce the workability of the public-private distinction.7 The model is
of an ideal typical character following the “Weberian” method. Allison
emphasises that the generalizations in his model are more explanatory
than conclusive and they invite supplementary and corrective research.8
His findings are based on the study of two legal systems, the English
and the French: “An analysis of the distinction between public and
private law in some other context, perhaps the Dutch or the German,
might accentuate features other than those in the model setting.”9
6 Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law, pp. 34–39.
7 Ibid., p. 36. Although it is tempting to do so, it is not our purpose to discuss the model’s features.
We are only using this model as a tool of analysis, since it is well known and rather influential in
English legal doctrine.
8 Ibid., p. 235.
9 Ibid., p. 40.
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Allison states: “Their general relevance would be reduced by clear in-
dications of successful distinction in other contexts (…) if those con-
texts lack the features described in my model.”10 Here we will pick up
the gauntlet.
First, as to the conception of the State, different theories of the State
and its functions have been developed in the Netherlands.11 These the-
ories, however, are conceived as being rather separate from legal the-
ory: the Dutch legal profession has generally been insulated from
political theory.12 It is disputed to what extent political theories found
their way into the organisation of the State, although certainly in the
1900s liberal theories were rather influential.13 (We mention this since
the public-private divide is indeed commonly associated with liberal
political theory.)14 Broadly speaking, the government – or, more accu-
rately, the State – is conceived as being legally distinct from private
individuals and as therefore suited to the application of different legal
rules, procedures and institutions. But, although there is a certain va-
gue notion as to the tasks of government, in Dutch law the government
is not regarded as being consistently identifiable through the elabor-
ation of institutional and functional distinguishing criteria, as required
in Allison’s model.15 As will be demonstrated hereafter, it is uncertain
which functions are to be characterised as governmental or public and
which are not. The substance of the public function is considered to be
contingent.16 The choice to designate certain functions as governmental
is usually laid down in – from a juridical-analytical point of view: ra-
ther arbitrary – political decisions. An outstanding example is that for
a long time preserving and promoting “The True Religion” was pre-
eminently considered a governmental function;17 today it is absolutely
not. Maintaining and operating prisons is today considered an out-
standing example of a governmental function in the Netherlands, yet
this should not necessarily remain so.18 Dutch legal and political theory
has quite some difficulty in deciding on even the core functions of the
State.
10 Op.cit., p. 235.
11 See Van der Pot, Handboek van het Nederlandse Staatsrecht, 15th edn. (Deventer 2006), 3 ff.
12 This is considered to be roughly the same in the UK. See Allison, A Continental Distinction in the
Common Law, p. 74.
13 In particular concerning the statesman Johan Rudolph Thorbecke. See E. Poortinga, De scheiding
van publiek- en privaatrecht bij Johan Rudolph Thorbecke (1798–1872) (Nijmegen 1987).
14 See e.g. P. Cane, “Public Law and Private Law: A Study of the Analysis and Use of a Legal
Concept” in J. Eekelaar and J. Bell (eds.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Third Series) (Oxford
1987), 57.
15 Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law, p. 34.
16 B.P. Vermeulen, “De publieke taak: een veel-zijdig begrip”, in J.W. Sap, B.P. Vermeulen and C.M.
Zoethout (eds.), De publieke taak (Deventer 2003), pp. 20 ff.
17 See for instance Lisa Jardine, Going Dutch: How England Plundered Holland’s Glory (London
2008).
18 See in a multinational context: J. Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism. How it Works, Ideas for
Making it Work Better (Cheltenham and Northampton 2008), 21.
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As to the second feature: indeed the Netherlands has a rather cat-
egorical approach to law.19 There is, for example, an extensive body of
statutory administrative law which is very distinct from private law.
Curiously, however, the law on governmental contracts and public
authority liability is historically rooted in private law. There is no
counterpart for private contract law in the field of public law. Likewise,
the law on public authority liability as part of the rules of public law is
only at an embryonic stage.20 Furthermore, the division between public
and private law is not exclusive: the applicability of public law does not
in itself exclude the applicability of private law standards at the same
time. Neither can cases simply be qualified as either public or private.
Usually this qualification depends upon the question which needs to be
answered in respect of the specific case and its context; and complex
cases give rise to both public law and private law questions. Moreover,
the criteria used for these kinds of qualifications are not entirely certain
and clear.
As regards the independence and expertise of the courts entrusted
with administrative disputes – the third feature – the Netherlands has a
separate branch of jurisdiction in administrative law cases. However,
the administrative courts in the first instance form a part of the ordi-
nary District Courts.21 District Court judges subsequently participate in
the different sectors (administrative law, private law and family law,
criminal law). Therefore, at this point the Dutch system is largely
similar to the judicial system in England and Wales. As to the courts of
second instance which hear administrative law cases (which at the same
time are – with the exception of tax law – the courts of last resort) the
situation is more complex in the Netherlands: the Administrative Law
Division of the Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van
de Raad van State) has a rather general jurisdiction in administrative
law cases; tax assessments are dealt with by the Court of Appeal
(Gerechtshof) and by the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) (both are the
ordinary courts of appeal in civil and criminal cases) and there are
two specialised courts, one for social security and civil service cases22)
19 Christof R.A. Swaak, “Public Law in the Netherlands” (1995) 1 E.P.L. 43.
20 A proposal to extend the General Administrative Law Act (GALA) with provisions on public
authority liability has been recently sent to Parliament, Kamerstukken II, 2010/2011
(Parliamentary Documents, Second Chamber), 32 621, no. 1–4. Aanvulling van de Algemene
wet bestuursrecht met bepalingen over nadeelcompensatie en schadevergoeding bij onrechtmatige
overheidsdaad (Wet nadeelcompensatie en schadevergoeding bij onrechtmatige besluiten).
21 A.F.M Brenninkmeijer, “Chapter 3 Judicial Organization”, in J.M.J. Chorus, P.H.M. Gerver and
E.H. Hondius (eds.), Introduction to Dutch Law (Alphen aan den Rijn 2006), at pp. 54–55 and 61.
See for a description of the historical development towards the current court system: R.J.G.H.
Seerden & F.A.M. Stroink, “Administrative Law in the Netherlands”, in: R.J.G.H. Seerden (ed.),
Administrative Law of the European Union, its Member States and the United States. A
Comparative Analysis (Antwerp & Oxford 2007), 184 ff.
22 In Dutch: de Centrale Raad van Beroep. The translation used on the official website of the Dutch
judiciary (www.rechtspraak.nl
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is: “the Central Appeals Tribunal”. However, it should be noted that
it is not comparable to the tribunals known in the English legal
system; therefore we prefer the designation “court”. and one for social-
economic administrative law cases.23 In sum: the courts entrusted
with administrative disputes are considered to be independent from the
administrative authorities. However, District Court judges are not
particularly specialised in administrative law; the judges in the separate
administrative courts dealing with appeal cases are, however.
When it comes to the fourth feature, the characterization of judicial
procedure, we can observe that although the Dutch administrative
courts traditionally take a slightly more investigative attitude than the
civil courts, the Dutch administrative courts do not follow an inquisi-
torial procedure (the assessment is limited to the grounds and facts
submitted by the claimant and the courts are very reluctant to use their
investigating powers).24 Civil courts, which because of their residual
competence also hear cases against governmental authorities, are
bound to follow a strict adversarial procedure. However, it should be
noted that a procedural aspect constituted the demand for the existence
of an administrative court: proceedings before the administrative
courts are less expensive and the courts are more approachable etc.
B. A Multifunctional and Context-Dependant Distinction
In the previous section we have demonstrated that the Dutch legal
system does not meet, in all respects, the features of Allison’s model.
Nevertheless, the public-private law divide has proven to be very
workable for Dutch law; the public-private division is a well-worn,
deeply-rooted division. At the same time we can observe that the pub-
lic-private law divide does not lead to a watershed between public and
private in Dutch law. Yet our statement concerning its workability is
motivated by the multifunctional and context-dependant approach of
the divide, which we consider to be the most productive approach. The
public-private divide does not have to result in a solid dichotomy;
neither does the qualification “public” or “private” have to be undis-
puted. As said, the main value of the public-private law divide is that it
facilitates the justification and rationalization of certain legal choices in
the legal system.
In a reply to Peter Cane, Allison designates the public-private law
divide as “the summa divisio or supreme distinction of Continental legal
23 In Dutch: het College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven, “officially” translated as “the Trade and
Industry Appeals Tribunal”. See the previous footnote for a comment on this designation.
24 A.J.C. de Moor-van Vugt and B.W.N. de Waard, “Chapter 17 Administrative Law” in J.M.J.
Chorus, P.H.M. Gerver and E.H. Hondius (eds.), Introduction to Dutch Law (Alphen aan den Rijn
2006), 364 ff.
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thought”.25 Indeed, there is no doubt that in a continental legal system
like the Dutch the distinction between public and private law is in this
sense the supreme distinction. The division manifests itself in the
Netherlands not only in judicial protection against governmental action
and in the nature of the applicable substantive law, but also in many
other spheres of law to which we shall not or only obliquely pay atten-
tion. The entire Dutch legal culture is imbued with this distinction, al-
though it is not the sole classifying mechanism. Not only can different
kinds of legal relationships be questioned regarding whether they are of
a public or private nature, but also areas of regulation, legal rules, judges
and lawyers. The division is also very important in legal education.
The supreme nature of the distinction does not impede its
context-dependant character. Referring to different countries as dif-
ferent contexts this is also recognised by Allison.26 However, we assert
that the supreme nature of the distinction does not interfere with its
multifunctional character. On the contrary, because it is the supreme
distinction it is used for multiple purposes and various criteria are
used for drawing the distinction. It is for this reason that we call the
distinction between public and private law a multifunctional and
context-dependant distinction.
Cane and Freedland largely concur with our view. Cane argues
quite extensively that the public-private divide has a normative di-
mension: “The public/private distinction can be understood as part of a
normative theory of accountability under which the exercise of public
functions should be subject to a particular accountability regime (...).”27
In his view the distinction does not only have a juridical normative
character but is ultimately a political one.28 From a Dutch point of view
there is no doubt that this is observed very prudently. For a continental
jurist who is focused on positive law, on the surface the descriptive
dimension of the public-private divide is the most obvious one: in most
day-to-day cases it is possible to determine without difficulty which
elements of a case are of a public or a private nature and what the legal
consequences of this public or private nature are (access to the courts,
substantive law etc.) Thus, not every case is difficult to qualify.
However, like in every continental system, the distinction is also used in
a normative and even a political sense: it is definitely a political choice
whether health care is a matter of public law or private law regulation
and what quality (public or private) the regulator should have.
Cane argues that the public-private divide should be regarded as a
25 J.W.F. Allison, “Variations of view on English legal distinctions between public and private”
[2007] C.L.J. 702.
26 Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law, pp. 40, 235, and Allison, “Variations of
view”, p. 703.
27 Cane, “Accountability and the Public/Private Distinction”, p. 271.
28 P. Cane, Administrative Law (Oxford, 4th ed., 2004), 17.
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value-based distinction.29 As will be demonstrated in the following
sections this is surely correct, at least in the Netherlands. From this
perspective we fully understand why Cane rejects the radical instru-
mentalist position of an empirically-oriented regulation scholar like
Scott;30 it is not only effectiveness that counts. Moreover: “effectiveness
and success can only be judged in the light of normative theory about
the way power ought to be distributed.”31 The next question in this
approach, of course, is how this value-based public-private distinction
should be drawn. In an earlier article Cane already called the public-
private law divide a “multifaceted” distinction.32 For this Cane has
more recently sought the answer in the idea of “polycontexturality”,33
which he borrows from Gunther Teubner.34 With this concept he tends
to lean towards a distinction that we regard as multifunctional and
context-dependant.
Mark Freedland is also inclined to think in terms of such a
distinction.35 He adheres to a normative approach defending the public-
private divide essentially in order to defend public law. Likewise in his
approach the distinction is not an absolute one, but is essentially multi-
dimensional, although he elaborates this multi-dimensional character
in a slightly different way than we do. Furthermore, it is very interest-
ing to note that Freedland explicitly acknowledges that public law is to
be regarded as intersecting, in very important ways, with private law
(and also with areas of regulation by law which are not very strongly or
clearly identified as being between public and private law). We will see
below a particular example of this so-called intersecting effect in the
context of Dutch general principles of proper administration and hu-
man rights which also apply when private law instruments are used by
public authorities.
29 “Accountability and the Public/Private Distinction”, p. 275.
30 Ibid., p. 271. Cane refers to C. Scott, “Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet
of Contemporary Governance” (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 56 and C. Scott,
“Accountability in the Regulatory State” (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society 38, 42.
Interesting for this approach is also C. Scott, “Spontaneous Accountability”, in M.W. Dowdle
(ed.), Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Cambridge 2006), 174 ff and C.
Scott, “Self-Regulation and the Meta-Regulatory State”, in F. Cafaggi (ed.), Reframing Self-
Regulation in European Private Law (Alphen aan den Rijn 2006), 131 ff.
31 Ibid., p. 275.
32 Cane, “Public Law and Private Law: A Study of the Analysis and Use of a Legal Concept”, p. 78.
33 Polycontexturality has become one of the central elements of autopoietic social and legal theory.
The autopoiesis of Gunther Teubner, which is based on the system theory of especially Luhmann,
did receive substantial attention in Dutch legal doctrine at the beginning of the 1990s, partly
because of the influence of the then Minister of Justice, Hirsch Ballin, who was originally a
constitutional and administrative legal scholar.
34 Cane argues that Teubner does not reject the public-private distinction (“Accountability and the
Public/Private Distinction”, p. 273). However, like Allison (“Variations of view”, p. 701) we
suppose that this interpretation of the, albeit very abstract, article by Teubner is not fully correct:
the idea of polycontexturality is in the eyes of Teubner – who tries to transcend the distinction – an
alternative to the public-private law divide, see G. Teubner, “After Privatization? The Many
Autonomies of Private Law” (1998) 51 Current Legal Problems 395, 396 and 407.
35 Freedland, “The Evolving Approach to the Public/Private Distinction in English Law”, pp. 107 ff.
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Hereafter, we will describe the working of the public-private law
divide in Dutch law in the area of judicial protection (part III) and the
applicability of certain standards of substantive law (part IV). This
analysis of Dutch law and the comparison with English law supports
the approach which is taken by Cane and Freedland and could serve as
a tool to elaborate their position in more depth.
III. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN THE FIELD OF
JUDICIAL PROTECTION
A. Some general Remarks on Judicial Protection in Dutch Law
from a Comparative Perspective
The public-private divide is important in both English and Dutch
law for choosing the right “route” in judicial protection; in other
words: this is one of the – multiple – functions of the public-private law
divide. In this section we will describe the Dutch system of judicial
protection in the perspective of the public-private divide and compare
it with the English system in this respect. At the end of this section
we will argue that differences in the use of the qualifications “public”
and “private” might very well be explained by the purpose for which
the distinction is used here and by the context of the legal system in
question.
It goes without saying that the public-private law divide is import-
ant in English law as to the amenability to judicial review. In the
famous O’Reilly case36 the House of Lords ruled that – besides some
exceptions which should subsequently be decided on a case-by-case
basis – the procedure for judicial review should be exclusive to public
law cases. Because of this decision it became necessary to qualify cases
as public law or private law in order to know which kind of proceedings
should be commenced. Although the strict nature of the rule from the
O’Reilly case has been greatly mitigated over the years, it is important
to realize that it really opened the door to considering the judging of
public law cases as a specific branch of jurisdiction. Moreover, the
Queens Bench Division of the High Court in England and Wales,
which is entrusted with the task of judicial review, is nowadays called
“the Administrative Court”.
In Dutch law, the judging of public law cases is also a specific
branch of jurisdiction. Unlike English law, Dutch law does not have a
two-tier system of statutory appeal and judicial review. Judicial pro-
tection by the administrative courts is only provided on a statutory
basis. Nowadays (that is: from 1994 onwards) this statutory basis can
be found in the General Administrative Law Act (hereafter: GALA;
36 O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237.
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Algemene wet bestuursrecht).37 An appeal to the administrative court is
restricted to a point of law; therefore these statutory appeals are – in
the same way as is the case for statutory appeals on a point of law in
English law38 – comparable to judicial review.
The GALA makes general provision for an appeal against – what
we will here translate as – “decisions” (besluiten). These decisions are
pre-eminently considered as public law actions. In general terms, the
appeal has to be lodged before the administrative section of the district
court. Whenever an act of a public body does not consist of a decision
which is susceptible to appeal, it is possible to address the district court
in a civil procedure (it is also common in those circumstances to refer to
the court as “the civil court”). Therefore the competence of the civil
courts is described as “residual”.39 The importance of the residual
competence of the civil courts should not be underestimated: the civil
courts can be addressed whenever there is no competence for the ad-
ministrative courts. This is rooted in the Guldenmond/Noordwijkerhout
case,40 decided in 1915, which introduced private law remedies in cases
concerning governmental actions. The legal basis for these remedies is
often to be found in the doctrine of “wrongful acts”. Although the
provisions concerning “wrongful acts” can be found in the Civil Code,
they also apply to public law bodies41 and thus provide the basis for a
claim against public bodies outside the scope of administrative law.
Not all decisions from public authorities are open to appeal. An
important exception are decisions containing primary or secondary
legislation or general policy rules. Nevertheless, because of the so-
called residual competence of the district courts in civil proceedings, it
is possible to address the civil courts in these matters.
All in all, the Dutch system of judicial protection could be described
as a system in which the law of the spirit-level applies: the more the
competence of the administrative courts is broadened, the less will be
covered by the residual competence of the civil courts and vice versa.
This is, of course, very different from English law where recourse to
civil (or private law) proceedings depends on the existence of a con-
tractual or a tortious relationship. Hereafter, in section III D, we will
contend that this dissimilarity might be an important explanation for
37 An English version of the General Administrative Law Act can be found on the website of the
Dutch Government (www.rijksoverheid.nl) at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-
publicaties/besluiten/2009/10/01/general-administrative-law-act-text-per-1-october-2009.html.
38 See E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] Q.B. 1044.
39 In English law judicial review is referred to as “residual” or “a remedy in last resort”. This
qualification expresses the precedence of other public law remedies (statutory appeals) to judicial
review. However, it does not define the position of judicial review with respect to the ordinary
procedure. In Dutch law the qualification “residual” is used to express the precedence of the route
for judicial protection by the administrative courts to the civil proceedings.
40 HR 31 December 1915, (1916) NJ 416. [HR is the abbreviation for Hoge Raad (Supreme Court).
NJ (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie) are Dutch Law Reports.]
41 See HR 20 November 1924, (1925) NJ 89 (Ostermann I).
182 The Cambridge Law Journal [2012]
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 22 Oct 2012 IP address: 130.37.129.78
the differences between Dutch law and English law as to the use of the
labels “public” and “private” for the purpose of amenability to judicial
review.
B. A closer Look at Access to Dutch Administrative Courts
An analysis of the definition of “decision” in the GALA reveals how
the jurisdiction of the administrative courts is determined. A “decision”
is defined as “a written decision of an administrative authority con-
stituting a public-law juridical act”.42 Only juridical acts with a public
law character can be considered as “decisions”.43 Before focusing more
precisely on the characteristics of decisions, it is important to know
that Dutch law distinguishes explicitly – more than English law does in
the context of judicial review – the qualification of the body from the
qualification of its – administrative – acts. The main rule for de-
termining if an individual is dealing with a “decision” is that the auth-
ority is invested with a specific statutory power to make legally binding
decisions, the essential part of a decision being that it is – by the uni-
lateral decision of the competent authority – legally binding on those to
whom it is addressed. Lacking a specific statutory power, the author-
ity’s act is either a mere factual action or a private law act. In this
connection it is important to note that all public bodies are presumed to
have the ability to act in private law as legal persons possessing legal
personality.44 Consequently, they can enter into contracts or use their
power resulting from the ownership of land and waterways without
disposing of a specific statutory basis in this respect. Indeed, the gen-
eral ability to use this private law power does not imply that public
bodies can use private law instruments as they please.45 However, pri-
vate law instruments can play an important role in realizing the public
goals taken up by the government. As regards our subject, these private
law acts are, just like factual acts, not amenable to appeal but they can
be challenged in a civil procedure.
Although the main rule in the Dutch doctrine is that a decision can
only be based upon a specific statutory power, this is not the whole
story. In past decades the Dutch administrative courts have found ways
of reasoning to accept the existence of decisions without a specific
42 GALA, s. 1 : 3(1).
43 See on the different kinds of decisions: De Moor-van Vugt and De Waard, “Chapter 17
Administrative Law”, note 24 above, pp. 345 ff.
44 De Moor-van Vugt and De Waard, “Chapter 17 Administrative Law”, note 24 above, pp. 349 and
Seerden & Stroink, “Administrative Law in the Netherlands”, note 21 above, p. 172–175.
45 On the contrary: there is also an important track of case law as to the question whether the use of
private law instruments by public bodies is permitted, concerning the fact that the authorities also
have public law instruments for the same or similar purposes. This is referred to as the “two-way
doctrine” (twee-wegenleer). The landmark case on this subject is the Windmill case, HR 26
January 1990, Ned. Jur. (1990) 393. See N. Verheij, “From Private Law to Public Law” (2000) 12
European Review of Public Law 495.
C.L.J. The public-private divide in English and Dutch law 183
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 22 Oct 2012 IP address: 130.37.129.78
statutory basis. The purpose of this reasoning is clear: this opens the
door to the administrative courts. This approach is referred to as a
“strategic” approach (in contrast to the “dogmatic” approach).46 But
there is more to this than just strategy: in particular, the case law con-
cerning the “public function” can be seen as a demonstration of the
changing dogma into a more functional approach to public law. It is not
the status of the authority or the source of the power that determines
the qualification of an act as public, but its substance.
The case law concerning the “public function” is an important ex-
ample of the approach whereby the scope of judicial protection by the
administrative courts is broadened. The main question considered by
the courts in those cases is whether the authority exercises a public
function. We find this approach in two types of cases which we – for
the purpose of this article – would categorise as follows:
1. The public function test and “classical” administrative authorities
The first category of cases concerns actions by a classical administrat-
ive authority47 (for example: the Crown, the Minister, the Mayor, the
Municipal Executive (the Mayor and the Aldermen)) that lack a spe-
cific statutory basis; in these cases the problem is the qualification
of these acts. An example of this can be found in the Long Lin case.48
Here, the Dutch Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water
Management prohibited a seriously damaged ship (called the Long
Lin) from entering Dutch territorial waters because he feared that the
waters would become polluted. He had asked the Chinese owners of the
ship to guarantee payment for the potential costs of clearing the waters,
but they had refused to do so. The Minister did not possess any specific
statutory power to deny access to territorial waters. Therefore, it was to
be expected that the administrative court would have determined that
the denial would have been based on the position of the State as the
owner of the waters, which would qualify the denial as a private law act
to be challenged in a civil procedure. But the court ruled that the
Minister, in denying access, was performing a public function: namely,
he was ensuring the quality of Dutch territorial waters. Consequently,
the denial was qualified as a decision which was susceptible to appeal;
an act of public law. This approach, though considered to be of fun-
damental importance, is used only in a limited amount of cases.49
46 Van Wijk/Konijnenbelt & Van Male, Hoofdstukken van bestuursrecht (The Hague, 14th ed. 2008),
p. 193.
47 In the definition in GALA, s. 1 : 1(1)(a): an organ of a juristic person governed by public law.
48 ABRvS 10 April 1995, (1995) AB 498. [ABRvS is the abbreviation for Afdeling
bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State (Administrative Law Division of the Council of
State). AB means Adminisratiefrechtelijke beslissingen (Dutch Administrative Law Reports).]
49 Another example is the case of the Groningen Water Supply System, in which the Groningen
municipal authorities prohibited the waterworks from laying underground pipes in municipal
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It would be a misunderstanding to think that all kinds of private law
acts by public bodies which have something to do with a public interest
are qualified as public law acts with this kind of reasoning. Therefore,
unlike the approach of the administrative courts described here, the
civil courts can still be addressed in most cases concerning actions by
public bodies which lack a specific statutory basis in public law.
2. The public function test and “non-classical” administrative authorities
The second type of cases where the public function test is used are cases
concerning private organisations not acting on a statutory basis.
Essentially, in these cases there are two hurdles to be cleared in order
to conclude that their actions are decisions which are susceptible to
appeal or – in other words – acts of public law: the organisation should
be qualified as an administrative authority and the (non-statutory) act
should be qualified as a decision. While using the public function test,
the courts have focused on the qualification of the organisations in
these types of cases. In addition to “classical administrative auth-
orities” under GALA an administrative authority can also be “any
other person or body vested with public authority”.50,51 “Being vested
with public authority” is generally interpreted as possessing the statu-
tory power to take decisions.52 Lacking any statutory basis, a private
organisation would not be considered to have such a power and
therefore would not be qualified as an administrative authority.
However, in the type of cases considered here, the courts have decided
otherwise. The subject-matter of the case law mainly concerns private
organisations providing financial support (e.g. subsidies) to citizens.
According to Dutch case law, these kinds of private organisations are
qualified as administrative authorities if (a) the subsidies are mainly
publicly funded and (b) a “classical” administrative authority has de-
termined or approved the criteria for providing the subsidies. In es-
sence, the courts regard the private organisations as a kind of
“extended arm” (verlengde arm) of the “classical” administrative
authorities. Thus, the foundation which was established to look after
the interests of former coal miners who suffered from silicosis
(Stichting Silicose Oud Mijnwerkers) – a private body – was held to be
an administrative authority when allowing or declining compensation
to former miners, since funding for this compensation was provided by
land, ARRvS 1 December 1977, AB (1978) 208 or a case concerning the municipal authority”’
refusal to pay for a private company’s relocation costs, ABRvS 11 May 1998, (1998) AB 298.
50 GALA, s. 1 : 1 (1) (b).
51 These “other administrative authorities” are often – but not always – of a hybrid character.
However, this category should not be identified as wholly equivalent to the hybrid authorities of
the HRA in English law.
52 Thus, the Examination Board of a private school granting official certificates is vested with public
authority. See ABRvS 17 July 2000, (2000) AB 446.
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the State and the State Secretary for Social Affairs and Employment
had approved the criteria formulated by the Foundation, the State
funding being only provided in cases meeting the criteria.53
C. Comparison between Dutch and English Law as to the Amenability to
Review before the Administrative Courts
Having sketched the outlines of the Dutch legal system, we can now
compare Dutch law with English law as to the amenability to review
before the administrative courts. Looking at English case law several
tests can be found for deciding whether a case should be qualified as a
public law case and therefore should be amenable to judicial review.54
The most important test is to consider the source of power:55 cases
concerning the use of statutory powers usually qualify for judicial re-
view. On the other hand, cases based on a private law relationship – for
the most part: contracts – are generally excluded from judicial review.
At first sight this seems similar to Dutch law. However, the Dutch
statute test differs from the English one in that it demands an express
and specific statutory power to take the decision in question.56 In the
English law system the focus of statutory provisions conferring powers
on public authorities seems to be more about the function of these
powers than the specific instruments which can be used by the auth-
orities. Moreover, for the purpose of amenability to judicial review,
English law does not dichotomise juridical acts and factual acts:57 un-
like Dutch law both are amenable to review. The same seems to hold
true for decisions concerning property;58 in Dutch law those decisions
will normally be classified as private law acts, which cannot be chal-
lenged before an administrative court. Some exceptions exist, as men-
tioned earlier in the Long Lin case. A public function test, developed
by the Dutch courts, sometimes brings these cases within the reach of
judicial review. In English law these cases will generally be covered
by the statute test. Thus, apparently departing from the same basic
principle – statutory power – the scope of judicial review is broader in
53 ABRvS 30 November 1995, (1996) AB 136. Another example can be found in the case concerning
the “Relief Fund for the Victims of the Bijlmer Aircraft Disaster Foundation” (Stichting
Hulpfonds Gedupeerden Bijlmerramp), ABRvS 27 August 2003, (2004) AB 10.
54 See for an overview of these tests: H. Woolf, J. Jowell & A. Le Sueur, De Smith’s Judicial Review,
6th edn. (London 2007), 124 ff.
55 For the purpose of the comparison it is not worthwhile considering the prerogative powers.
56 F.J. van Ommeren and G.A. van der Veen, Het Awb-besluit (Nijmegen 1999), 43 ff.
57 Ibid., pp. 122–123
58 It should be noted that in English law decisions concerning governmental property taken by local
authorities or by other statutory bodies need a statutory basis, see R. v Somerset County Council ex
p. Fewings [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1037. This does not apply to central government; in this respect these
authorities are considered to have powers which they have in common with every individual. This
is referred to as the “third source of power”. See B.V. Harris, “The “third source” of authority for
government action revisited” (2007) 123 L.Q.R. 226–250.
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English law than in Dutch law, because the question whether a statute
provides for a public law power is answered in a different way.
The second test in English law is the so-called public function test.
This test is to be considered as complementary to the statute test.59 It
seeks to determine whether a body, lacking any formal statutory pow-
er, is nevertheless exercising a public function.60 The public function
test is seen as the courts’ legal response to privatization, contracting
out, self-regulation etc., which have led to the performance of all kinds
of activities by private bodies in what used to be the public domain.
Case law shows that the courts use several tests to determine whether
such a private body exercises a public function and will thus be amen-
able to judicial review. The most important case on this matter remains
Datafin,61 which gave rise to a line of related case law on how the
“public function” test can be satisfied. De Smith’s notes the “but for”
test, the statutory underpinning test, the fact that a body is exercising
extensive or monopolistic powers, the absence of consensual sub-
mission, and the public funding test – the last one being “of only mar-
ginal relevance”.62
One can find some similarities between the public function test in
Dutch and English law. If we compare the various aspects in English
case law to Dutch case law, we recognize in the Dutch case law men-
tioned above (especially the case concerning the former coal miners
suffering from silicosis) the public funding test. Just like in English
law, public funding is not in itself sufficient to justify the qualification
“public”; otherwise many subsidised organisations would only there-
fore be qualified as public. The other important aspects in this case –
the determination or approval of the criteria for conferring compen-
sation – which transformed the private body into an “extended arm” of
the State, bears some resemblance to the “but for” test (in the sense that
but for the performance of the private body, the government would
have provided the compensation itself) or the aspect of statutory un-
derpinning (the government has woven the body into the fabric of
public regulation by explicitly making the public funding dependent on
its approval of the criteria). In defining these aspects a link to mere
governmental action is sought. It is important to note that the Dutch
case law mentioned here actually represents the only examples in which
59 Although rule 54(1) CPR, in which the public function test is established, suggests that the public
function test is the overall test for amenability to judicial review. See also C.D. Campbell, “The
nature of power as public in English judicial review” [2009] C.L.J. 90 who speculates about the
non-complementary status of the public function test. Oliver however alerts us to not taking the
text of CPR Pt 54 too literally, because it is “shorthand for quite complex case law”. See D. Oliver,
“Functions of a public nature under the Human Rights Act” (2004) P.L. 346, 347.
60 According to Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur, De Smith’s Judicial Review, pp. 124–125 the public
function test is also used for qualifying statutory acts based on Private Acts of Parliament.
61 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] Q.B. 815.
62 See op.cit., pp. 133–137.
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the non-statutory actions of private bodies are qualified as decisions
amenable to review. Dutch law does not attach great importance to
such an aspect as the existence of extensive monopolistic powers, which
appeared to be very important in the context of the Datafin case.63
Therefore, as to the non-statutory actions of private organisations, a
broader category of cases come within the reach of judicial review in
English law than is the case in Dutch law. In Dutch law this category is
mainly restricted to private organisations providing subsidies or other
kinds of financial contributions. A case which is comparable with the
Datafin case would never fall within the jurisdiction of an adminis-
trative court in the Netherlands.
D. Possible Explanations for the Differences between English Law
and Dutch Law
Although “administrative law” or “public law” was previously
regarded as something of an alien concept in English law (largely as a
result of the influence of Dicey), we now find that the label “public law”
is used in cases where the Dutch continental tradition would never
consider using it. It is interesting to look for an explanation for this
different approach.
The first explanation might be found in the existence of judicial
protection outside the scope of judicial review: in this respect English
law differs immensely from Dutch law. In his speech in Datafin Sir
John Donaldson M.R. stated: “The principal issue in this appeal, and
the only issue which may matter in the longer term, is whether this
remarkable body is above the law.” If the Take-Over Panel had not
been amenable to judicial review, Datafin could not achieve effective
judicial protection elsewhere, for example by obtaining a remedy in the
ordinary procedure, the reason for this being that the competence of
the civil courts depends on the existence of a contractual or a tortious
relationship which did not exist in this case. As seen above, Dutch law
has the “fall-back” option of the residual competence of the civil
courts: whenever there appears to be no possibility to address the ad-
ministrative courts because the action of the administrative authority
is not held to be characterised as a decision, the civil courts can be
addressed. Therefore, the absence of jurisdiction for the administrative
courts will only result in the claimant having to resort to the civil courts
but it will not result in him or her being left without any remedy.
63 Colin D. Campbell has critically examined the “but for” test and the “statutory underpinning” test
(“The nature of power as public in English judicial review”, pp. 90–117) and has even promoted a
monopoly test as the sole test – also replacing the source of power test – for determining the
availability of judicial review (C. D. Campbell, “Monopoly power as public power for the
purposes of judicial review” (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 491–521).
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A second explanation is closely related to the subject-matter of the
next section and will therefore only be briefly addressed here. In
English law the amenability to judicial review is much more important
for the applicability of public law standards than in Dutch law re-
garding amenability to appeal. The Dutch civil courts will apply
these public law standards to all kinds of activities of classical64
administrative authorities which fall outside the scope of appeal.
Therefore, it is not necessary to create a broad jurisdiction for the ad-
ministrative courts in order to achieve the applicability of public law
standards. Thus the administrative procedure is primarily confined to
those classes of cases in which the specific characteristics of this pro-
cedure are mainly held to be important: cases concerning the unilateral
decisions of administrative authorities (“decisions”).
This latest point also relates to a more fundamental issue: what is
the actual purpose of the existence of a separate jurisdiction of the
administrative courts? Answering this question comprehensively would
go far beyond the reach of this article, but we can touch upon some
essential differences of perspectives which can also serve as an expla-
nation for the different approach of the public-private divide in the
context of judicial review.
From a Dutch perspective, two purposes of the judicial review
of administrative actions can be broadly distinguished. First, judicial
review could enhance the quality of administrative decision-making
(thus a review serves the promotion of “good administration”).
Secondly, the function of judicial review could be to guard the rights of
the individual against the abuse of official power. After a decades-long
debate, the Dutch legislator cut the knot: judicial review by the ad-
ministrative courts is supposed to serve as the protection of citizens,
not the improvement of governmental quality (although, of course, this
can be seen as a by-product).65 This choice affects the nature of the
judicial procedure. Due to the residual competence of the civil courts,
the main purpose of the jurisdiction of the administrative courts is not
to provide judicial protection as such, but has to be found in the special
features of the administrative procedure. The competence of the ad-
ministrative courts serves the aggrieved citizen by providing an infor-
mal and less expensive avenue for judicial protection. These features
are held to be important in cases in which administrative authorities are
able to do things which no one else would be able to do: to determine
someone’s legal position by a unilateral decision.
64 As to the “other administrative authorities” this does not hold true, since they are only
administrative authorities in as far as they take decisions in which case the administrative courts
will be competent.
65 E.J. Daalder, G.R.J. de Groot, J.M.E. van Breugel (eds.), De parlementaire geschiedenis van
de Algemene wet bestuursrecht: Tweede Tranche (Alphen aan den Rijn 1994), 174. See also De
Moor-van Vugt and De Waard, “Chapter 17 Administrative Law”, note 24 above, pp. 364 ff.
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In English law, the purpose of judicial review was historically un-
ambiguous: the role of the courts was to preserve the boundaries of
executive powers which Parliament had drawn while conferring powers
on public authorities (the “ultra vires” rule).66 From this perspective
judicial review can be regarded as a kind of accountability mechanism.
However, the debate started in 1987 by Dawn Oliver concerning the
foundations of judicial review67 also appears to have cleared the way for
ascribing more purposes to judicial review. In addition to an account-
ability mechanism, with nowadays a broader perspective than legality
in the strict sense of “intra vires”, judicial review is now considered to
serve as the judicial protection of citizens and promoting the quality of
the administration.68,69 We mention these developments here because
they – and this holds especially true for the perspective of judicial re-
view as a mechanism of judicial accountability in the present-day
sense – might explain the broad scope of judicial review in English law
compared to Dutch law.
Summarizing our findings: the comparison of English and Dutch
law shows that for the purpose of judicial review English law uses the
label “public” more generously than Dutch law does. Thus the question
of how to divide public law from private law is answered differently in
the context of the different legal systems. In our opinion an important
explanation for this divergence can be found in the respective legal
systems themselves. In other words: the colouration of the public-
private divide is context-dependant.
IV. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. Some general Remarks on Substantive Dutch Law from
a Comparative Perspective
The public-private divide has also become important in another con-
text: the applicability of a certain set of rules – public law or private law
standards. In English law this is most clearly the case with the Human
Rights Act 1998 (hereafter: HRA), but the development of substantive
and procedural rules is much broader. The Dutch substantive public
66 See for instance, H. Barnett, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 6th edn. (Abingdon 2006), 719.
However, Craig argues that this historical explanation is incorrect, See P. Craig, “Ultra vires and
the foundations of judicial review” [1998] C.L.J. at pp. 79 ff.
67 D. Oliver, “Is the ultra vires rule the basis of judicial review?” [1987] P.L. 543. See for the debate
between the supporters of the Ultra-vires model and the rights-based approach: C. Forsyth (ed.),
Judicial Review and the Constitution (Oxford 2000); M. Elliott, The Constitutional Foundations of
Judicial Review (Oxford-Portland 2001).
68 Woolf, Jowell & Le Sueur, De Smith’s Judicial Review, pp. 7, 8.
69 Craig, just as many others, nowadays advocates a rights-based approach, see P. Craig,
Administrative Law (London, 6th ed., 2008), pp. 18 ff. Poole, who strongly criticises this
approach, labels it as common law constitutionalism (CLC). See T. Poole, “Back to the Future?
Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism” (2003) 23 O.J.L.S. 453; “Questioning
Common Law Constitutionalism” (2005) 25 L.S. 142.
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law standards comprise in particular the public law standards of the
GALA, the so-called “general principles of proper administration” and
human rights.
In the context of our thesis it is of course relevant to know how and
to what extent the applicability of substantive law depends on the
public-private law divide. To prevent any misunderstanding, according
to Dutch law the basic principle is not that public law standards would
only be applicable in public law relationships and private law standards
would only apply in private law cases. On the contrary, right from the
outset it should be noted that in Dutch law the applicability of public
law does not automatically exclude the applicability of private law
standards at the same time.
However, in another way the public-private law divide is very rel-
evant for the applicability of substantive law. In Dutch law it is a basic
principle – with only one important exception to which we will pay
attention later – that public law standards are only applicable to public
authorities. In order to facilitate the judging of the applicability of
public law standards, it is necessary to qualify the person or body who
is acting: is it a public authority or not? The question of the public-
private law divide here shifts to the question of the legal status of the
body whose acts have to meet certain standards.
In English law the applicability of public law standards is also de-
pendent on the legal status of the acting body. Human rights are only
applicable to public authorities. Both legal systems are therefore rather
similar in this respect.
However, as regards the so-called “horizontal effect” of funda-
mental or human rights there is a difference between the two systems
which will turn out to be rather important. Dutch law is less reluctant
to allow a certain horizontal effect to fundamental or human rights.70
We will demonstrate that this difference between the legal systems may
serve as a possible explanation for the fact that in Dutch law a body is
less easily qualified as a public authority.
B. The Dutch general Principles of Proper Administration
The first set of public law standards which are of interest are the gen-
eral principles of proper administration which guide the exercise of
administrative action. These principles are partly codified in the
GALA – for example, the principle to state reasons for decisions which
are taken, the principle of due care, the principle of proportionality etc.
70 Olha Cherednychenko, Fundamental Rights, Contract Law and the Protection of the Weaker Party
(Utrecht/Munich 2007), 104 ff and Chantal Mak, Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law:
A Comparison of the Impact of Fundamental Rights on Contractual Relationships in Germany, The
Netherlands, Italy and England (Austin 2008), 145 and 146.
C.L.J. The public-private divide in English and Dutch law 191
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 22 Oct 2012 IP address: 130.37.129.78
In dealing with a case the Dutch administrative courts will start
by applying administrative law standards. However, in cases – few,
though of fundamental importance – in which those standards do not
provide for a suitable answer, the administrative courts also resort to
private law standards, for example the rules laid down in the Civil
Code.71 Nowadays there is some discussion as to the question whether
these private law standards are directly applicable or only in an anal-
ogous way.72
Conversely, according to Dutch law, it is important to note that
public law standards also apply when the actions of public authorities
are to be qualified as private law acts (which are not reviewable in the
administrative courts, as seen above). Thus the applicability of these
public law standards does not have an exclusive character. Whenever a
public body uses its position as a landowner or enters into a contract –
in Dutch law qualified as private law acts – both private law standards
(the Civil Code) and public law standards (the general principles of
proper administration) would apply.
In the landmark case of Amsterdam v Ikon, the Supreme Court ruled
that the general principles of proper administration, and particularly
the legal principle of equality, were directly applicable to governmental
action based on private law. Later case law shows that this rule applies
regardless of what kind of general principle of proper administration is
concerned and regardless of what kind of governmental private law act
is in question.73 A few years later, this ruling was codified in the Civil
Code (section 3:14) and in the GALA (section 3:1(2)). Hence, a com-
bination of the applicability of public and private law standards is a
rather common phenomenon in Dutch law.
As to the applicability of substantive public law standards it is im-
portant to distinguish the classical administrative authorities from
other administrative authorities.74 Classical administrative authorities
must comply with public law standards regardless of the nature of their
acts, e.g. public or private (buying computers), juridical or merely fac-
tual (informing the public). As to the other administrative authorities,
however, according to the GALA the public law standards only apply
in as far as they are administrative authorities, which means in as far as
they are invested with public authority. Hence, the other administrative
authorities only have to take public law standards into account to the
71 ABRvS 29 September 1994, (1995) AB 210.
72 M. Scheltema and M.W. Scheltema, Gemeenschappelijk recht: Wisselwerking tussen publiek- en
privaatrecht, 2nd edn. (Alpen aan den Rijn 2008), 6.
73 HR 24 April 1992, (1992) AB 542; (1993) NJ 232 (Zeeland/Hoondert).
74 The concept of administrative authorities in Dutch law is a general concept which is codified in the
GALA and is applied in the entire area of administrative law. Therefore, the interpretation given
to this concept, considered in the previous section, as to the amenability to appeal is also relevant
for the applicability of the principles of proper administration.
192 The Cambridge Law Journal [2012]
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 22 Oct 2012 IP address: 130.37.129.78
extent that they take decisions; as to other kinds of acts they can behave
like every private legal person. Thus, the GALA system is very com-
parable with the system of the Human Rights Act 1998 in English law
on which we will focus later.
C. Human Rights in Dutch Law
The second set of public law standards which should receive attention
are fundamental rights or human rights. Since their primary function is
to protect individuals against public or administrative authorities, their
applicability is of the same nature as demonstrated in the former sub-
section focusing on the public law standards in the GALA and the
general principles of proper administration. Upon the general reform
of the Dutch Constitution in 1983, the Government stated that all
public bodies are subject to the fundamental rights of the Constitution,
regardless of the nature of their acts, including, in particular, private
law acts.75 Thus, in the Rasti Rostelli case the Supreme Court held that
the freedom of religious belief and practice prohibited the municipal
authorities of a small town (with a major orthodox protestant com-
munity) from refusing to let a municipal hall to an artist whose per-
formance they objected to solely on religious grounds.76
In principle, the impact of human rights on legal relations between
private legal persons is also accepted. The acceptance of this so-called
“horizontal effect” was again stated in the general constitutional re-
form in 1983,77 although it is still not undisputed in Dutch legal doc-
trine.78 The actual horizontal applicability of each fundamental
right should be considered on a case by case basis. Moreover, different
levels of horizontal effect can be distinguished.79 Merely an indirect
horizontal effect is met when a fundamental right gives a certain di-
rection to the interpretation of a private law provision. On the other
hand, a full direct horizontal effect is met when the courts apply human
rights directly – taking account of the statutory limitation clauses – in
relationships between individuals. There is no strict division of
the different levels of horizontal effect; it is rather a sliding scale.
Since the Netherlands has a monistic system for the implementation of
75 Kamerstukken II, 1975/76 (Parliamentary Documents, Second Chamber), 13,872, no. 3, p. 15.
76 Rasti Rostelli: HR 26 April 1996, (1996) AB 372; (1996) NJ 728.
77 Kamerstukken II (Second Chamber) 1975/76, 13 872 no. 3, pp. 15, 16. See E.A. Alkema, “Chapter
16 Constitutional Law” in J.M.J. Chorus, P.H.M. Gerver and E.H. Hondius (eds.), Introduction to
Dutch Law (Alphen aan den Rijn 2006), 307.
78 C.A.J.M. Kortmann, Constitutioneel recht, 6th edn., (Deventer 2008), 389 ff. L.F.M. Besselink,
“Voetangels en klemmen: de horizontale werking van burger- en politieke rechten”, in
C. Flinterman and W. van Genugten (eds.), Niet-statelijke actoren en de rechten van de mens:
gevestigde waarden, nieuwe wegen (The Hague 2003), 3. Cherednychenko, Fundamental Rights,
Contract Law and the Protection of the Weaker Party, pp. 104 ff.
79 See e.g. Cherednychenko, Fundamental Rights, Contract Law and the Protection of the Weaker
Party, pp. 106 ff.
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international law, the horizontal effect is similar for international
human rights.
Analyzing Dutch case law, few cases can be found in which
human rights are applied explicitly in relations between private legal
persons. The famous Dutch case on horizontal effect is the AIDS test
case.80 In this case a rape victim claimed that the court should order the
rapist to undergo an AIDS test so that she would know whether she
might be contaminated with HIV. The rapist referred to his funda-
mental right of physical integrity. The Supreme Court accepted
the horizontal effect of this fundamental right in principle, although in
this case the interest protected by this fundamental right was weighed
against the victim’s justified interests. More cases can be found in
which human rights give a certain direction to the interpretation
of a private law provision, such as the provisions concerning
“wrongful acts”.
D. Comparison between Dutch and English Law as to the Effect
of Substantive Law
Below we take a look at the applicability of public law standards in
English law and draw a comparison between the two legal systems. It is
important to realize that whenever the full horizontal effect of human
rights becomes more accepted practice, the less important the debate
about the public-private law divide will become. After all, with full
horizontal effect human rights are also applicable to non-public auth-
orities and thus the public-private law divide is no longer relevant.
English law has not generally accepted the horizontal effect of hu-
man rights, although there is some discussion as to the applicability of
human rights in horizontal relationships.81 Like in Dutch law con-
cerning the applicability of the general principles of proper adminis-
tration, in English law the applicability of human rights depends on the
type of administrative authority. The definition of “public authorities”
to which the HRA applies can be found in section 6 HRA. A first
category of “public authorities” is the so-called “core public auth-
orities” (“classical” public authorities; a Minister, a County Council
80 HR 18 June 1993, (1994) NJ 347. See for an English translation: L.F.M. Besselink (ed.),
Constitutional Law of the Netherlands: An Introduction with Texts, Cases and Materials (Nijmegen
2004), 159.
81 In favour of a horizontal effect appears to be, for example, H.R.A Wade & C.F. Forsyth,
Administrative Law (Oxford 10th ed., 2009), 160. There is also the view that because the courts are
“public authorities”, they are obliged to apply human rights in relationships between individuals.
In addition to this there is the view (for example, Oliver, “Functions of a public nature under the
Human Rights Act”, note 59 above, p. 334) that on the basis of the ECHR the participating states
are obliged to design a legal system in which individuals are protected against the violation of their
rights by other individuals. Consequently, it would not have been necessary to design a special
regime for public authorities. Indeed, one can find a few cases in which the courts practise some
kind of horizontal approach (Douglas v Hello! concerning privacy). However, there is no general
acceptance of a horizontal effect.
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etc.). It is not necessary to classify the actions of these public auth-
orities, because the HRA applies to all their actions (also, for example,
to buying computers). A second category is the so-called “hybrid public
authorities”, which are described in section 6 (3) (b) HRA as “any
person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature”. The
HRA only applies to these authorities in as far as they can be classified
as “hybrid public authorities”- when they are performing a function of
a public nature. Moreover, in section 6 (5) HRA it is stated that in
relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue
of only subsection (3) (b) if the nature of the act is private. It turns out
that this system is based on a scheme similar to the Dutch scheme on
the applicability of substantive public standards: for classical public
authorities the HRA is applicable to all their actions; to hybrid public
authorities the HRA only applies in as far as they perform functions of
a public nature.
The interpretation of “hybrid public authorities” is of great im-
portance for the applicability of the HRA to private or privatised or-
ganisations. For several years there has been robust discourse as to the
scope of this definition.82 Although there is a certain similarity between
the tests in the context of judicial review and the tests in the context of
the HRA, the concept of a “public function” in both contexts should
not be identified. An important note is that the test whether a body is
exercising a function of a public nature in the context of the HRA is
only relevant for the so-called hybrid public authorities. As seen in the
context of judicial review, reading the CPR gives the impression that
for the amenability to judicial review, the public function test is a
general test which should always be applied. If we consider this to be
true, a logical conclusion would be to qualify all activities performed by
core public authorities which have been proven to be amenable to ju-
dicial review as performances of a public function.83 From this point of
view a logical argumentation would be that the transfer of activities
from a core public authority to a private body does not change the
82 See e.g. P. Craig, “Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the scope of judicial review” (2002)
118 L.Q.R. 551; Elizabeth Palmer, “Should public health be a private concern? Developing a
public service paradigm in English law” (2002) 22 O.J.L.S 663; Maurice Sunkin, “Pushing forward
the frontiers of human rights protection: the meaning of public authority under the Human Rights
Act” [2004] P.L. 643; Dawn Oliver, “Functions of a public nature under the Human Rights Act”
[2004] P.L. 329; Peter Cane, “Church, state and human rights: are parish councils public
authorities?” (2004) 120 L.Q.R. 41; Helen Quane, “The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the meaning
of a “public authority” under the Human Rights Act” [2006] P.L. 106; S. Palmer, “Public private
and the Human Rights Act 1998: an ideological divide” [2007] C.L.J. 559; Jonny Landau,
“Functional public authorities after YL” [2007] P.L. 630; C.M. Donnelly, Delegation of
Governmental Power to Private Parties. A Comparative Perspective (Oxford 2007), 245 ff. See
also two reports of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Meaning of Public Authority under
the Human Rights Act (Seventh Report of Session 2003–04, London: HMSO 2004 and Ninth
Report of Session 2006–07, London: HMSO 2007).
83 Oliver however warns against this kind of reasoning, see Oliver, “Functions of a public nature
under the Human Rights Act”, pp. 346–348.
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public-function character of this activity.84 However, this was not the
conclusion of the House of Lords in the YL case in 2007, 85 where a
private body exploiting a care home was held not to be performing a
public function. Therefore, there are two possible conclusions. Either
the CPR test of the public function is not the general test it purports to
be (proof for this conclusion is that it is seldom used in cases concern-
ing core public authorities acting on a statutory basis) or the meaning
of a “public function” in the context of judicial review is different from
the meaning of a “function of a public nature” in the HRA.86 Whatever
the right conclusion may be, the YL case has generated a great deal of
criticism regarding the House of Lords’ explanation of a “function of a
public nature”. It is interesting to see that the case argumentation is
partly dogmatic and partly political and pragmatic. Shortly after this
ruling it was explicitly stated in the Health and Social Care Act 2008
that the kinds of organisations concerned in the YL case should, for
the purpose of the HRA, be considered to be hybrid public authorities.
This kind of intervention by the legislature – to make fundamental
rights directly applicable by qualifying the specific body as a public
authority – is not as yet of a generic nature. The same discussions could
still arise in other fields, for example in the field of education or health
care.87
Transferring the YL case to the Dutch context, the Dutch courts
would never categorise a private care home like Southern Cross as an
administrative authority. The question as to the legal qualification of
Southern Cross as a public or private authority would not even arise.
Therefore, the House of Lord’s conclusion in the YL case comes as no
surprise from a Dutch point of view; on the other hand, the inter-
vention in the Health and Social Care Act 2008 is very surprising! As
demonstrated earlier, in Dutch law the general principles of proper
administration are only applicable to administrative authorities. Thus,
the general principles of proper administration would not be applicable
in a similar case in Dutch law.
However, whether or not a private care home is labelled as an
administrative authority does not imply that, according to Dutch law,
human rights would not be applicable in this case. As seen before, in
Dutch law there is some space for a horizontal approach of human
84 See in this sense: P. Craig, “Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the scope of judicial
review, p. 556.
85 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27; [2007] 3 W.L.R. 112.
86 However, it should be noted that prior to the YL case several courts had already ruled that similar
decisions by private bodies as emerged in the YL case were not amenable to judicial review. See R v
Servite Houses, ex parte Goldsmith [2001] 33 H.L.R. 35 and R v Leonard Cheshire Foundation, ex
parte Heather [2002] ECWA Civ 366.
87 Thus it is interesting to note that Lord Neuberger in his opinion in the YL case ([2007] 3 W.L.R. at
164) already took a shot across the bows: in his view the provision of health or education services
in a private school or hospital would not obviously be considered as a function of a public nature.
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rights, although the scope of the horizontal effect of human rights is
still in dispute. Therefore YL’s claim for one’s private life, family life
and home to be respected could in Dutch law very well be successful
against a private party like a care home.
E. Possible Explanations for the Differences between English
and Dutch Law
It is remarkable that in English law the labels “public law” and “public
authority” are used in a wider sense than in Dutch law. Again, it is
worthwhile searching for explanations for the differences between
English and Dutch law.
First, since Dutch law is more generous in its interpretation of the
horizontal approach to fundamental rights or human rights, there is no
need to use the label “public” for private parties which exercise a public
function in order to lean towards the applicability of these rights.
Moreover, public law standards also apply to the private law acts of
classical administrative authorities, so there is no need to categorise
these acts as “public law acts” in order to realize the applicability of
these public law standards. Another explanation is somewhat more
technical and focuses on the remedy approach which is more dominant
in English law. While there is a statutory duty for a public authority to
arrange and fund housing and care for elderly people (as it was in the
YL case), an individual could instigate a claim against the local auth-
ority – in Dutch law based on a wrongful act – for not having made the
kind of arrangements that comply with, for example, article 8 ECHR.
However, it is doubtful that instigating such a claim in Dutch law
would prevent the claimant being removed from the home; most
probably it will result in financial compensation. Yet, in Dutch law in a
case like YL financial compensation would be considered – unlike in
English law – a sufficient remedy. It seems that in English law this ap-
proach, which would require the acceptance of damages paid by the
local municipality as a substantive and sufficient remedy, is not con-
sidered as an acceptable solution. Therefore, English law is searching
for a means of redress against the private organisation with responsi-
bility for the care home. This might explain the need for the qualifi-
cation of the private care home.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Both in the English and in Dutch legal system the distinction between
public law and private law has turned out to be a distinction which is
used for different purposes. Thus the distinction appears to be, what we
would like to call, a multifunctional distinction. Moreover, the distin-
guishing markers differ depending on the purpose of the distinction.
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Thus the distinction is not only found to be multifunctional but
also context-dependant.88 In English law this is most clear looking at
the public function test in the context of judicial review and in the
context of the HRA. However, although a different understanding of
the labels “public” and “private” can be accepted in the light of the
multifunctional and context-dependant character of this distinction, it
does not deserve the beauty prize within the ideal of a coherent legal
system.
The context-dependant character of the public-private distinction
can also be demonstrated by referring to the results of the comparison
of Dutch law and English law. In the former sections we have demon-
strated that the choices drawing the line between public and private law
differ in respect of the context of the legal system in which the division
applies. Therefore, considering the Dutch legal system, the demands
for using the label “public” differ from the demands of English law. An
example of this can be found in the (compared to English law much
greater) possibility of obtaining judicial protection in a civil procedure
based on the wrongful act doctrine, which decreases the necessity to
qualify a case as a public law case in order to obtain judicial protection
in a procedure before the administrative court (lacking such possibi-
lities in English law, the Take-over panel in the Datafin case was held to
be amenable to judicial review). The same holds true for the applica-
bility of human rights, since Dutch law is more generous in accepting a
horizontal effect of these rights. All this explains why the label “public
law” in Dutch law is used in a narrower sense than in English law.
Regarding public law as a continental label, English law would seem to
be more Catholic than the Pope!
How does one evaluate these findings? It is rather remarkable that
in the Dutch legal system – a system in which, compared to the English
system, the public-private law divide is historically more deeply rooted
and in which public law is more settled – the label “public law” is used
in fewer kinds of cases than in the English legal system, particularly
concerning the transfer of power to private bodies. This is different
from what might be expected on the surface. After all, English law has
or has had quite some aversion towards the public-private law divide
and the divide has only recently become more important. Against this
background it is surprising to find that the area of public law has taken
up a rather large space.
We have noticed that the public-private law divide in English
scholarly writing is often presented as a solid dichotomy. However, we
have demonstrated that both in a continental legal system like the
88 G.T.J.M. Jurgens and F.J. van Ommeren, De opmars van het onderscheid tussen publiekrecht en
privaatrecht in het Engelse recht (The Hague 2009), 108–110.
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Dutch legal system and in a common law legal system like the English
legal system, the public-private law divide is not unambiguous. This
observation does not lead to the conclusion that the division is not
workable; our thesis is that a more productive and more clarifying
approach is to consider the public-private divide as a multifunctional
and context-dependant divide.
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